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A Contract-Enhancing Norm Limiting Federal Preemption of Presumptively State Domains
NimRazook*

I. INTRODUCTION

Given the extensive federal regulation of areas as diverse as food and
drug 1 and environmental2 regulation, civil rights, 3 and, more recently,
product liability law, 4 individuals and businesses predictably and rationally seek advantageous regulatory reform. Advocates seek national rules
that provide them strategic advantages and challenge those that pose strategic problerns. 5 They have concluded, apparently, that relying on stateby-state reforms can be a long and tedious process, and that although
cumbersome and complex, our national government can provide comprehensive regulatory relief that our diverse and often divided states cannot.
Generally unconstrained by constitutionallimits, 6 the debate over the
propriety of these national regulations has remained principally within
the extralegal realm of politics, a milieu which generally defies the prescriptions of academics. Several scholars have, nonetheless, proffered

* Copyright © 1997. Associate Professor of Legal Studies in Business, The University
of Oklahoma.
1. See DoNNA J. WOOD, STRATEGIC USES OF PUBLIC POLICY: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1986) (analyzing the passage of the Pure Food Act of 1905).
2. See HARVEY LlliBER, FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS (1975) (documenting the effect
on federalism of national clean water laws); Samuel P. Hays, Three Decades of Environmental
Politics: The Historical Context in GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLif!CS: EsSAYS ON
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR Two 27 (Michael J. Lacey ed., 1991) (tracing
history of forces leading to significant, federal environmental laws).
3. See, e.g., BURKE MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964) (examining the
tensions between national civil rights legislation and federalism); THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
(BNA) (1964) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS ACT) (reviewing the scope and spirit of the CRA of
1964).
4. See, e.g., Product liability Fairness Act, S. REP. No. 215, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992)
5. WOOD, supra note 1 (documenting this strategic activity in the passage of the Pure Food
Act of 1906).
6. Most would agree that the U.S. Supreme Court has given virtual plenary power to
Congress to act under the commerce clause. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) (stating that for most of the last half century, the
United States has had no law of federalism); But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, U.S.
(199 5) (finding abuse of congressional authority under the commerce clause regarding a federal
law banning pos.session of a gun in local school zone).
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suggestions, 7 perhaps revealing both a fidelity to the federal system and a
faith that Congress or even the courts will listen.
This paper pre..<;cribes contract-based constraints on national
preemptory regulations which are aimed at historically state-dominated
areas such as product liability law. Part I examines the norms of federalism including "locus of control" and the presumption favoring state regulatory action in those common law areas in which states have enjoyed an
historic regulatory monopoly. The locus of control norms discussed
herein govern the appropriate level of regulation between the state and
national governments. Noting the shortcomings of these norms which
tend to perpetuate politicization, Part I suggests the need for an additional
analytic layer. Part II contends that a "contract-enhancing norm" has
been, since the Progressive Era, the implicit or explicit justification for
the most significant national incursions into presumptively state domains.
This is most evident in the application of the contract-enhancing norm in
the elimination or reduction of information and/or power asymmetries in
contract and contract-like settings. Part II suggests that such a norm has
four effects: first, it provides a defensible analytic tool for reducing the
influence of politics in federal preemption decisions; second, it synthesizes the norm<; of federalism and contract into a simple model for evaluating the appropriateness of Congressional preemption of historic and
comprehensive state regulation; third, it develops an argument against
national product liability reform based upon this model; fourth and
finally, it contends that the differences in mobility patterns between individuals and businesses reinforce these conclusions.
II. THE NORMS OF FEDERALISM

A political relic to some, 8 federalism nonetheless attracts works from
a variety of academic fields. 9 These include both claims that federalism

7. See, e.g., THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG
GOVERNMENTS (1990) (favoring state over national public policy for most areas); Susan Bartlett
Foote, Beyond the Politics of Federalism: An Alternative Model, I YALE J. oN REli. 217 (1984);
C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93 (1983).
8. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HAMILTON & DONALD T. WELLS, FEDERALISM, POWER, AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY: A NEW THEORY OF FEDERALISM'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LIFE 3 (1990)
(claiming that liberals and conservatives view "federalism as a cumbersome dinosaur, blocking
policies they wish to see implemented."); PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS
6 (1986) (labeling federalism a "buzzword"); Powell, supra note 6.
9. These include, but are not limited to, economics, history, law and political science. See,
e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (1966) (demonstrating
positive political science perspective); William Graebner, Federalism in the Progressive Era: A
Structural interpretation of Refonn, in GROWfH OF THE REGULATORY STATE, 1900-1917, at 102-26
(Robert F. Himmelberg ed., 1994) (giving an historical account of state-federal tensions during
progressive reforms); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE
GROWfH OF NATIONAL POWER (1992) (describing evolution of and reasons for federalism
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must recapture its constitutional stature, 10 as well as others that make no
such assumption. 11 This paper takes the latter position. It acknowledges
the former works and their importance and depends on many of their
stated norms of federalism, but does not assume that federalism must retain its legal substance to be worthy of review and analysis. Its only assumption is that one or more of our great legal or political institutions
must decide between the states and the federal government as the appropriate locus of control over historically state domains. The next subsection addresses the criteria influencing these "locus of control" decisions.

A. Locus of Control Norms
Normative federalism falls into two general categories: first, prescriptions embracing or subordinating federalism compared to other governmental forms (such as a unitary state12); and second, locus of control prescriptions. Locus of control prescriptions concern the appropriate division of powers and responsibilities between the central and local governments in a federal state. The norms most often cited favoring local and
central control follow.
Six major arguments supporting local control have been promulgated:
1. Local units are more responsive to local tastes and conditions. 13
2. Local regulation encourages a common market of states competing
with one another for citizens through differential offerings of public
goods.14

movement toward more national power); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995)
(advocating legal work favoring re-legalization of federalism); Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation, the
American Common Market and Public Choice, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 119 (1982) (favoring
economic competition among states as preferable to federal preemption in most cases); Jacques
LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1994) (justifying federal intervention into areas of commerce only
where state regulation would be inefficient because of excessive externalities); Richard A. Posner,
Toward An Economic Theory of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 41 (1982) (basic
economic treatment of federalism).
10. E.g., Calabresi and LeBoeuf, supra note 9.
11. E.g., Foote and Gray, supra note 7.
12. A unitary state or system has only one governing unit. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does
Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J. PoL. EcoN. 152 (1981)
(comparing unitary and federal state structures using social choice theory).
13. Calabresi, supra note 9, at 775; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196, 1210 (1977).
14. Calabresi, supra note 9, at 775-76; LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 559. Both authors cite
the seminal work on point. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
PoL. EcoN. 416 (1956) (providing an economic analysis of the benefits of local over central
governance).
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3. Local governments are laboratories experimenting with the optimal
provision of public goods and services. 15
4. Local control encourages a greater awareness of the social costs of
legislation. 16
5. Decentralization diffuses power so that no coalition can easily
acquire control over national affairs. 17
6. Local governments, because they are smaller than the central government, are more efficient regulators. 18
Four arguments supporting central control oppose the above
arguments in favor of local control:
1. Centrally-made rules encourage economies of scale so that interstate
and international markets are not encumbered by local regulations. 19
2. Central regulation reduces the social costs of governance through
standardization (i.e., currency). 20
3. Central government intervention may control the problem of externalities arising from the states' unwillingness to internalize the social
costs of their local rules. 21
4. A central government must intervene when local governments are
denying residents fundamental rights. 22
Of course, these same norms might be used either to defend a federal
over a unitary state or to prescribe central over local regulation. For example, one may defend federalism based upon its tolerance for and preservation of local tastes and conditions. Decentralizing the authority to
manage these local preferences might further both the premises of tolerance and preservation as well as the local control norm. However, if local
tastes and conditions are both worthy of protection, perhaps because they

15. See LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 561-62 (citing local experimentation as a benefit of
decentralization).
16. Jd. at 563.
17. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 9, at 6.
18. DYE, supra note 7, at 106 (claiming that argument~ for national intervention are rarely
based on more efficient governing).
19. Calabresi, supra note 9, at 780.
20. Jd.
21. Externalities created by state regulations can be positive or negative. For example,
rigorous clean water rules in an upstream state inure to the benefit of downstream states with less
rigorous rules, thus creating positive externalities. If the upstream state has the less-than-rigorous
rule.~, then this creates negative externalities for it~ downstream neighbors. See LeBoeuf, supra note
9, at 570.
22. The obvious example is civil rights. MARSHALL, supra note 3, at 2-4 (calling the civil
right~ problem a "moral dilemma").
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represent fundamental rights, and in peril because of local government,
then centralizing control may be an appropriate prescription.
Three norms are mentioned most often in the debate concerning Congress' nationalization of product liability law. State product liability laws
further the local laboratory and competition-among-states norms because
they embellish local regulatory or public policy schemes. However, these
same liability laws can also pit states against each other. The laws also
vary among the states, are quite complex, and arguably pose regulatory
problems for manufacturers, insurers and other companies. 23 When these
local laboratories adopt rules that disproportionately affect interstate
firms, some will argue that these state rules create negative externalities
which in turn encourage national intervention. 24

1. A Competition-Among-States Model
Thomas R. Dye champions both the competition-among-states and
state-over-national-regulation models. 25 Dye's notion of "competitive federalism" envisions a "marketplace" for state governments "where
consumer-taxpayers can voluntarily choose the public goods and services
they prefer, at costs they wish to pay, by locating in the [state] that best
fits their policy preference."26 Although he does not address directly
product liability or state common law issues, Dye's conception of federalism suggests that those affected by these state regimes will know and understand the variety of rules offered by the states, be sufficiently mobile
to take advantage of those regimes that further their utilities (and avoid
those that do not), and respond accordingly. According to Dye, state law,
even in this complex regulatory environment, is preferable to national
regulation.
As applied to state product liability and other common law regimes,
Dye's theory falls short. If his assertions are correct, then the principals
in product liability litigation - manufacturers and other sellers, insurers
and consumers - will make both location and operation decisions based
upon their rational response to each state's regulatory environment. However, while it is true that we are among the most mobile societies in the

23. See Victor R. Schwartz, Finally a Chance to Refonn Product liability Law, WALL ST.
J.,. Sept. 9, 1992, at Al5 (lamenting the negative effects of state product liability laws on such
businesses).
24. See RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODIJCf LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED
FROM THE POLff!CS OF STATE COURTS (1988); LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 584-85 (finding
persuasive the argument that product liability rules may impose "substantial costs" on out-of-state
entities).
25. DYE, supra note 7.
26. !d. at 14 (emphasis added).
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world, 27 there is scant evidence that state public policies are important
variables influencing interstate relocation by individuals. 28 Interstate
movement is more closely tied to employment opportunities and local
amenities. 29 Additionally, making the assumption that individuals are
knowledgeable, sensitive, or concerned about the arcane world of state
common law rules defies both logic and the modest empirical evidence
on point_3°
Businesses, on the other hand, are knowledgeable about and sensitive
to competing public policies, particularly state and local fiscal incentives
which encourage relocation. 31 Businesses might also have the financial
incentives and means to stay abreast of state regulatory regimes, including state common law. Edmund Kitch states that businesses have both the
incentive and ability to acquire information about state product liability
regimes and to fold this information into their marketing and pricing decisions.32 Kitch's theory suggests that Dye's model might be normatively
suitable for firms that are in the business of operating within the
standards established by state common law regimes, but appears to have
little normative appeal when applied to individuals, whose immersion
into the realm of product liability law represents an ex post facto response to a failed transaction or other negative occurrence. Any theory of
federal preemption of state product liability or other common law
regimes must necessarily consider the relative differences between the
relocation reasons of individuals versus those for businesses.
2.

A Negative Externality Response

Judge Richard Neely harbors a decidedly different view from that of
Dye. 33 Neely suggests that state product liability rules create significant

27. Between 1990 and 1991, seventeen percent of U.S. citizens moved from one address
to another. See Patricia Gober, Americans On the Move, POPULATION BULL. Nov. 1993, at 1. By
international standards, this places the United States with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as
one of the most mobile societies. Id.
28. In fact, there is little research indicating a link between state public policy decisions,
especially those generated by the common law, and citizen location. One study does link Canadian
provincial location and provincial fiscal policies. See Kathleen M. Day, Interprovincial Migration
and Local Public Goods, 25 CANADIAN J. ECON. 123 (1992).
29. Gober, supra note 27, at 28-32 (linking interstate relocation primarily to jobs and quality
of life amenities).
30. See ROBERT EWCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 14445 (1991) ("Ordinary people know little of the private substantive law applicable to decisions in
everyday life.").
31. See David Cay Johnston, Boom Seen in State and Local Tax Aid to Business, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1995, at D4 (citing survey of companies, including comments that state and local
tax incentives continued to be effective means of attracting businesses).
32. Kitch, supra note 9, at 124-25.
33. NEELY, supra note 24.
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negative externalities because states are competing among themselves for
the assets (in the form of damages) of out-of-state citizens. 34 States use
their product liability regimes as wealth creators at the expense of
nonlocals. This "race to the bottom" mentality, is, in Neely's view, both a
rational response by the states to their control over product liability law
and a compelling reason for federal intervention. 35 If states could jointly
enact meaningful reforms to combat this race to the bottom, then they
might overcome the negative externalities wrought by their current regimes. Jacques LeBoeuf, however, suggests that the transaction costs associated with such interstate cooperation are too high, thus eliminating a
Coasian solution. 36 He also finds Neely's conclusions about product liability law to be persuasive, noting that a product liability system "generous to plaintiffs can result in the imposition of substantial costs on out-ofstate interests.'m
As comprehensive solutions for product liability, Neely's and
LeBoeuf's views, like Dye's, have their shortcomings. Their theories remind us that identical criteria can yield virtually irreconcilable conclusions, common in normative discussion and their arguments do not regard
the numerous product liability reform efforts by the states as antithetical.
The adoption by the states of damage limits, statutes of repose, and other
reforms certainly does not square with Neely's "race to the bottom" and
LeBoeuf's "insurmountable-transaction-costs" theses. 38
What the opposing but ostensibly reasonable views of Dye, Kitch,
Neely, LeBoeuf and others suggest is that the norms of federalism are
instructive rather than dispositive, probabilistic rather than deterministic,
and potentially emotive39 rather than rational. In sum, they are quite amenable to a political debate in which the key issue of federalism - locus
of control - becomes subsumed by underlying issues such as product
liability law. Those who benefit or suffer from the nationalization of
product liability or other state-dominated regimes will likely invoke the
norms based on the goal of nationalization rather than a genuine fidelity
to the federal system. They will do so notwithstanding over two hundred

34. /d. at 57-79.
35. /d.
36. LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 574 (citing insurmountable transaction costs as a major reason
why the Coase Theorem does not solve the negative externality problem among states).
37. /d. at 585.
38. For a compilation of sum laws, see 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) '1!90, 110-195, 295 (1995)
(compilation of state product liability Jaws, including reform measures).
39. Emotivism suggests that "all evaluative judgments are nothing but expressions of
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling." Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice
Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1318 (1982) (distinguishing emotivism from factual
judgment5 in constitutional theory).
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years of national and state activity and as if every locus of control decision can be made de novo.
An intellectually incomplete but useful method of reducing the prospects of a de novo analysis is to recognize a presumption favoring state
regulatory authority over historically state-dominated areas. The next
subsection addresses this presumption.
B.

Presumptively State Domains

Several commentators support a broad presumption favoring state
over federal law. C. Boyden Gray, an official in the Reagan administration, advocated such a presumption and identified tour situations in
which national action may be preferable to state action. These include
situations in which state actions unduly burden interstate commerce, federal accommodations are necessary, the costs occasioned by interstate
competition become too high, or the advantages of national expertise
mandate federal action. 40
Providing a thoughtful alternative, Susan Bartlett Foote first identit1ed the shortcomings of Gray's prescriptions. These include the "absence
of specific criteria" signalling the need for national action, despite the
presumption favoring state law, and the "stark choice between state and
federal control suggested by that framework." 41 Foote claimed that the
obvious product of these shortcomings is the continued politicization of
federalism. 42 Foote's alternative offered five categories ("stages") -the
product, production, the process of exchange, conditions of sales and service, and conditions of use - providing "discrete" regulatory boundaries
within which "the legitimate interests of both the states and the federal
government" might be accommodated. " 43
Applying these authors' criteria to product liability appears to yield
similar results. Addressing product liability directly, Gray contended that
this is an appropriate area for federal preemption because state regimes
are unduly burdening interstate commerce, and states have demonstrated
no desire to adopt uniform reform measures. 44 Although not addressing
product liability directly, Foote suggested such preemption, maintaining
that nationally uniform standards are appropriate for product design and

40. Gray, supra note 7, at 94.
41. Foote, supra note 7.
42. !d. (claiming that, "in the absence of specific criteria, politics, rather than
principles, often determines when the presumption [favoring state-level regulation]
overcome." !d.).
43. !d. at 219-21.
44. Gray, supra note 7, at 98 ("(l]n this substantive area the federalist process
experimentation and testing of alternative approaches has already had a full opportunity to
the issues.").

guiding
will be

of state
develop

163]

Contract-Enhancing Norm Limits on Federal Preemption

171

performance. These national standards would apparently supplant state
product liability regimes to the extent that state legislation, regulations, or
interpretations, impose higher or lower product standards. 45 Otherwise,
she claimed, states with more rigorous standards will impose costs on
interstate firms which assume they must comply with these higher standards.46
Both of these models are useful, but each is also incomplete and
vague in its application. First, neither model is clear about the breadth of
this presumption. It is probably inappropriate to presume in favor of state
activity when such activity is nominal, nonexistent, or falls within an historically federal domain. Second, embracing a presumption favoring state
action merely defers the locus of control question unless the criteria for
overcoming that presumption are rigorous and unambiguous. Because
they either restate the traditional norms or add little to overcome the presumption, de novo and politicization problems raised in the previous subsection, Gray's criteria fail this test. Foote's model adds fairly observable
criteria and more rigorous standards to the debate and is preferable to
Gray's. However, like Gray, Foote largely ignores the level of state activity over which her federal preemptive standards might lay. One might
differentiate, for example, between comprehensive, national environmental laws which preempt diverse, often infantile or nonexistent state
regimes, 47 from common law regimes such as tort and contract. These
common law areas and their statutory embellishments fall uniquely
within the realm of state regulation. 48 In fact, Congress, reluctant to preempt these well-developed common law rules, has often included "saving
clauses" intended to insulate the cmnmon law from nationallegislation. 49
Foote's application of her model to chemical labeling cases 5°
suggests an additional problem with her locus of control criteria. She pos-

45. Foote, supra note 7, at 219-20.
46. /d.
47. See LIEBER, supra note 2, at 191-94 (describing the application of the 1972 Clean Water
Act amendments as uneven because of the "disunited" efforts made by the states in dealing with
clean water issues); Hays, supra note 2 (claiming that environmental values and regulations varied
measurably among states and regions).
48. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (placing the common law squarely and
uniquely within the province of the state courts).
49. A saving clause in a federal statute "saves" state common law from "the annihilation
which would result from an unrestricted repeal" [or preemption]. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1510
(4th ed. 1968). An example of a saving clause appears in 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed)
("Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not
exempt any person from any liability under common law.")
An example of a saving clause, applied to citizens' actions against polluters, appears
in 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1988): "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief . . . ." Id.
50. See Foote, supra note 7, at 221-24 (applying her model to chemical labeling regulation).
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its that federal law should govern product design and performance but
that states should retain at least some regulatory powers over production
and process of exchange issues, which include those involving information flow. 5 1 Extending these criteria to chemical labeling, she asserts that
OSHA labeling standards should preempt state regulation because "state
labeling rules mandating that specific language be affixed to containers
prior to shipping will increase manufacturers' costs. "52 Although Foote
does not expressly state that such preemption should also preempt state
common law duties to provide information, she implies exactly that, since
labeling represents the single best method of conveying all relevant information to the product's ultimate users. 53
The problem here lies in distinguishing product design, performance,
packaging and labeling from the plethora of information issues in product
cases. For example, Ford Motor Company complied with federal rear impact standards but possessed material information about their Pinto's
ability to withstand such impact. 54 It is difficult to discern whether
Foote's model would have preempted those state court decisions which
held Ford accountable for this ethical lapse. 55 In general, product producers may comply with preemptive national design, performance, packaging
or labeling standards, but they also may possess measurably more information about product design, performance and potential problems than
anyone else. If manufacturers possess information concerning product
shortcomings that reasonable consumers need, but comply with federal
standards, then whether such compliance preempts state courts from reviewing, ex post facto, a producer's product design and performance decisions is unanswered by Foote's model.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that a presumption favoring
state over national action and Foote's more rigorous model for overcoming such presumption offer direction but lack coherency and a moral underpinning. Part III contends that contract adds an historically-based, simple, yet powerful analytic layer to these locus of control decisions.

51. ld. at 220-21.
52. !d. at 223.
53. Foote maintains that her standards may allow state information requirements that do not
affect the product's package, but does not include state common laws among these requirements.
Although one might reasonably infer that common law rules would be included, one may also
reason that imposing additional information requirements upon manufacturers, which use their
packaging and labeling as primary information-conveying devices, imposes undue burdens on
national markets. /d. at 221.
54. See Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed
Opportunities, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 379 (1992) (recounting the company culture and decision-making
that went into the decision not to spend $11.00 per car to upgrade the Pinto's ability to withstand
a rear-end collision).
55. E.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor. Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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III. CONTRACT AND LOCUS OF CONTROL DECISIONS
Still very much alive56 and despite its limits, 57 contract provides
philosophic and ethical direction when Congress or the courts must decide between national preemption or continued state control of state common law domains. Rather than contradicting previous models, contract
adds an additional and useful layer of reasoning to the calculus. Its central theme is that the choices by rational, autonomous actors, cloaked
with sufficient information58 and relatively equal bargaining power are
worthy of legal protection. This theme has played an important role in the
works of ethicists and legal commentators 59 who have applied these tenets to areas as diverse as corporate ethics 60 and regulation of drug treatments for HIV positive patients. 61
Unlike these cases, contract norms applied to federalism emphasize
contract's functional elements such as information and choice: conditions
precedent for contract norms to apply. Rather than suggesting a contracttype relationship or a social contract theory of federalism, I will offer a
simple locus of control model that depends on whether the substantive or
procedural rights created by a rule increase or decrease these functional
elements of contract. I will also argue that contract has, historically, been
an implicit but important factor in federal preemption decisions.

56. See GRAN!' GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); see also Symposium.
Reconsidering Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1995) (reviewing
Gilmore's famous work).
57. Su MICHAEL J. TREBU>COCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRALI' (1993); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The limiLY of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995)
(both discussing the breadth and reach of contract, its limits and their reasons).
58. I chose to use the adjective "sufficient," instead of the economic term "full" to measure
the relevant information necessary to comply with the contract thesis. Sufficient information is just
that: each party has sufficient information to make a voluntary exchange. This term, therefore, may
represent a less ambitious requirement than full information. See generally ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 48, 235-36 (1988) (citing lack of information as a cause of
market failure).
59. See lAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas Donaldson, Contractarian
Business Ethics: Current Status and Next Steps, 5 Bus. ETHICS Q. 173 (1995); Steven R. Salbu,
Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A Contractarian Model of Access, 11 YALE
J. ON REG. 401 (1994).
60. Dunfee & Donaldson, supra note 59 (applying contract ideas of rational consent to
justify corporate existence, "principles, policies and structures").
61. Salbu, supra note 59 (applying a rational consent model to new and experimental HIV
drug access).
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A. Functional Elements of Contract
Contracts in competitive markets are efficient, 62 assuming the actors ·
within that market are rational, that there are no or only modest negative
extemalities, 63 that these actors have full information concerning their
choices and their consequences, 64 and that the parties are of equal or
nearly equal bargaining power. 65 This ideal setting describes very few
actual market environments, but is instructive both for economists who
wish to compare empirically actual and idealized markets and for others
who use the essential components of contract to critique actual or proposed norms. Those who choose the latter strategy attempt to analyze actual or proposed relationships based on the presence of these contract
components. Both they and economists will agree that actors prefer more
information over less and that evenly distributed bargaining power diminishes the probability of market failure occasioned by coercion or similar
problems. 66
Information and power are also important components of moral, sociological, and political theories of contract. The assumption of informed
and empowered actors is central to a stakeholder theory of corporate conduct, 67 constituting a "noncontractual" but cooperative understanding between manufacturers and suppliers, 68 an informal, but accepted and enforced norm among ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California, 69
and a reinforcement through constitutional theory of minority representation.70

62. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 58, at 230.
63. Externalities, especially negative externalities, often play a significant role in contract
and market failure because they impose costs on non-consenting third parties. ELLICKSON, supra
note 30, at 58-77 (citing negative externalities as problematic in the exchange process); COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 58, at 230.
64. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 58, at 235-36 (citing "full" information as a
prerequisite for an efficient contract).
65. Trebilcock dedicates an entire chapter to the threat posed by coercion, including unequal
bargaining power, to individual autonomy in contracts. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 57, at 78-101.
66. Trebilcock cites the highwayman's admonition, "Your money or your life," as an
example of a case in which a fully rational actor, cloaked with sufficient information, lacks the
autonomy necessary to make a voluntary decision. This threat of physical violence creates an
asymmetry in bargaining power and results in a breakdown of contract. /d. at 84-85.
67. The seminal work on point is R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984) (in which the frrm's existence and obligations depend on its
relationships with those affected by its decisions); Dunfee & Donaldson, supra note 59 (arguing
that a firm's moral obligation depends on an implicit social contract with society).
68. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (citing extra-legal norms as more descriptive of long-term contract
relations than formal contract rules).
69. See ELLICKSON, supra note 30, at 177-78 (citing information obtained within informal,
close knit groups as essential to the non-legal methods of resolving potential disputes as used by
the ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California).
70. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (applying a theory of
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Of course, both information and power distribution play particularly
important roles in tort and product liability law. Information asymmetry
often provokes duties to warn, create or expand product instructions, and
provide sufficient, reliable information for potential investors. Congress,
state legislatures, and courts have often placed on the possessors of relevant market information the burden of providing that information to those
for whom the costs and probability of discovery were respectively too
high and too low. At common law, coercion in the form of fraud, duress,
and undue influence provoked rescission rights for the victims. Statutory
theories such as unconscionability1 1 represented public policy responses
to power asymmetries.
The common element among these legislative, judicial and moral responses is the allegiance to contract theory and its functional elements.
For example, leveling the information and power fields for contracting
parties is no panacea but usually leads to lower transaction costs, 72 better
commercial and consumer choices, and a more stable commercial environment. These are all worthy goals, but, by themselves, provide no answer to the locus of control question. The next subsection addresses this
issue.

B.

Contract Elements and Locus of Control

An appropriate next step in determining whether a compelling case
for federal preemption exists is to ask whether the existing or proposed
federal law enhances contract by providing its beneficiaries with necessary information or power. Unlike previous models which furnish ammunition to both sides of the federalism argument, a contracting model posits that the only compelling cases amenable to federal intervention or preemption are those in which federal action furthers contract by eliminating
or reducing information and/or power asymmetries. If it does, then federal preemption mighF 3 be an appropriate response. If it does not, then
preemption is simply not appropriate, and the deciding institution- be it
Congress or the courts - should defer such regulation to the states.

constitutional interpretation based upon the expansion of citizens' ability to participate in their
government).
71. u.c.c. § 2-302 (1977).
72. Transaction costs arise from the formation, performance and enforcement of contracts.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 58, at 236. One might argue that leveling information and power
availability might cost more; however, in the long run such leveling will tend to reduce the costs
associated with obtaining information or acquiring contracting power from other sources.
73. This paper does not prescribe national intervention in such cases. In fact, the federal
government might view the states as appropriate contract-enhancing governments. See infra text
accompanying notes 91-98.
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It should be note-d that using contract in this manner is not novel; con-

tract or contract-like reasoning has been the explicit or implicit justification for most significant federal preemptive legislation passed since the
beginning of the Progressive Era. 74 Anti-trust and pure food and drug
laws during the Progressive Era addressed both information and power
asymmetries. These laws delimited the monopolistic power of holding
companies, 75 and mandated safer products and more accessible information.76 Labor legislation during the thirties and forties, responding to
power asymmetries between management and workers, had a decidedly
contract underpinning. Such early twentieth century reforms were the
result of a conscious decision by labor leaders to embrace freedom of
contract as the "gospel" of the labor movement. 77 National securities laws
sought both to deliver relevant information to investors and to control
those cases where insiders and others may appropriate this information at
the expense of other investors. 78 Civil rights laws preempted contrary,
discriminatory state laws which not only deprived their own citizens of
important political power but also imposed discriminatory laws on the
citizens of other states who happened to be within their borders. 79
Product liability certainly cannot claim the moral imperative of civil rights
nor can its preemption compare with the sweeping changes created by
national labor, anti-trust, or even securities laws. It does, however, compare favorably to two recent national incursions into historically state
domains such as the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (FCCP A) 80
and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 81 Both of these statutes preempted presumptively state domains, 82 but with contract-enhancing rules.

74. The Progressive Era includes roughly the last two decades of the nineteenth and the first
two decades of the twentieth century. During this time, reformers were instrumental in convincing
both states and the national government to adopt many of their proposed reforms, including pure
food and drug laws. antitrust legislation, and worker compensation laws. See WooD, supra note
1; Graebner, supra note 9.
75. C.F. Taeush attributes Congressional passage of the Sherman Act to a fear of "a new
power on the social horizon: Business." Business and the Shemum Act, in ANTITRUST AND
REGULATION 52 (Giles H. Burgess., Jr. ed., 1992). Taeush labeled corporations "a new kind of
social energy, comparable in size and strength and value with state and church." !d.
76. See WOOD, supra note 1, at 143-46 (citing proper labeling as central part of Pure Food
Act).
77. See WII.lJAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
128-166 (1991)(asserting that labor's adoption of a contract theme displaced more radical and less
tolerated themes).
78. See Federal Bar Association, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 19331982, at 20 (1983) (citing full publicity and information as essential elements of the 1933 law).
79. See MARSHALL, supra note 3, at 2 (commenting on President Kennedy's commitment
to address this "moral dilemma" through preemptive legislation).
80. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1601-1691(f) (1994).
81. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2301 (1994).
82. Prior to the FCCPA, virtually all consumer credit transactions were governed by state
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The FCCPA cloaked consumers with the right to credit information in
consumer transactions, 83 equal credit opportunities, 84 garnishment protection laws, 85 and a limited right of rescission in residential home mortgage
cases. 86 Although the preponderance of the FCCPA' s provisions are
aimed at disclosure of credit terms to consumers, the equal credit opportunity, garnishment, and rescission rules attempt to correct the power
asymmetries which often exist in consumer credit transactions.
Magnuson-Moss was aimed primarily at product suppliers who make
written warranties to their customers. The law requires such suppliers to
label their warranties as "full" or "limited,"87 creates minimum standards
for all written, product warranties directed at consumers, 88 and applies
disclosure rules to product service warranties. 89 It also prohibits providers
of written warranties from disclaiming implied warranty liability. 90
The areas preempted by these two laws were extensively regulated by
the states and were therefore presumptively state domains. However, because both of these national rules responded to potential market failures
and were contract-enhancing, they were appropriate actions. By enhancing contractual elements, they overcame the presumption favoring state
action.
Rather than indicting current state regimes or subjecting them to
comprehensive federal preemption, the application of a contract-enhancing norm to locus of control issues represents both a reasoned extrapolation of one hundred years of federal activity and a knowable and usable
moral underpinning for invoking federal action. This model allows states
to retain virtually unfettered discretion over their common law regimes
and leaves untouched those tields for which state activity has been uneven, modest, or nonexistent. 91 The model, however, does allow federal
intervention in those cases implicating both the traditional norms of federalism and these contract-enhancing norms. It is important to restate that

common and statutory law. For the regulatory environment that preceded the FCCPA, see 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1984-2025 (reprinting H.R.Rep. No. 90-1040 (1967)). Likewise, the MagnusonMoss Act partially preempted state common law and the Uniform Commercial Code. See 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7706 (reprinting H.R.Rep. No. 93-1107 (1974)).
83. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1604, 1637-38 (1994).
84. !d. §§ 1691-1691(1).
85. !d. §§ 1671-74.
86. !d. § 1635.
87. !d. §§ 2302-03.
88. 15 u.s.c. § 2304 (1994).
89. !d. § 2306.
90. !d. § 2308.
91. Historic examples might be civil rights or environmental regulation. See LIEBER, supra
note 2, at 72 (identifying diverse levels of environmental regulation by the states prior to the 1972
amendments); CIVIL RIGHTS Acr, supra note 3, at 7 (twenty-five states had laws similar to the
Civil Rights Act at the time of il~ passage).
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this model does not prescribe federal intervention in such cases. States
are eminently capable of managing and correcting their common law regimes through legislation or judicial decisions. Rather, contract is a useful "acid test" to determine whether federal action is an appropriate alternative to state action in these presumptively state domains. To restate yet
another important point: neither Congress nor the courts should encroach
on these domains unless such action fosters both locus of control and
contract norms.
The following matrix models the operation of these norms.
Enhances Contract

Does Not Enhance
Contract

State Action

i.

X

ii.

X

Federal Action

iii.

X

iv.

0

The "X"s in cells i - iii identify appropriate state or federal actions,
while the 0 in cell iv. indicates the one case where federal action is inappropriate. The following subsections develop each cell's contents more
fully.
1. State Adoption of Contract-Enhancing Rules.

In cell i, a state has adopted a contract-enhancing rule, i.e. a rule that
attempts to correct or improve situations involving information and/or
power asymmetries. Examples include state consumer laws, such as the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, which contain rules similar to those in
the FCCPA, 92 and rules governing unconscionability. 93 These are
certainly appropriate actions within presumptively state domains. They
further both contract and federalism.
2. State Adoption of Rules Which Do Not Enhance Contract.

Examples of state rules that do not enhance contract include those
that limit a product liability plaintiff's ability to acquire relevant, proprietary information possessed by the defendant, place ceilings on damages
in such cases, or create repose periods for product liability actions. Such

92.
93.

See, e.g., OKLA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 6-510 (West 1983).

U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).
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rules may or may not be good policy, but because they do not make information more accessible nor level the power of the parties involved, they
are not contract-enhancing. Although they further federalism, but not
contract, these rules are appropriate state actions in presumptively state
domains.
3. Federal Adoption of Contract-Enhancing Rules.
In cell iii, federal judicial or legislative action culminates in a
contract-enhancing rule. As previously stated, the national government
has significantly encroached into the presumptively state domain of
contract-enhancing norms. If, over time, state rules like those in cell ii
create information or power asymmetries, then Congress might require
those who have relevant and usable information to provide it to those
who do not or may provide political or commercial power to those needing additional powers to make rational choices. These federal preemptive
actions further contract, square with historic national incursions, and
therefore protect federalism.
Detractors may claim that if contract-enhancing norms must precede
national preemption of presumptively state domains, then contract, like a
gas, will expand to fill this analytic volume. Thus, anyone may arguably
find a contract rationale for action. Although I believe such claims are
tenuous, I suggest that those wishing to make these contract-enhancing
assertions be given a forum in which to do so and that if the weight of
public, legislative or judicial opinion supports their argument, then perhaps such arguments merit consideration under the auspices of public
policy.
4. Federal Adoption of a Rule Which Does Not Enhance Contract.
Examples of inappropriate actual or proposed federal actions falling
within cell iv include recent product liability reform efforts by Congress,
assertions by some manufacturers that federal product safety standards
should preempt state common law theories ofrecovery94, and Congress'
decision not to include a saving clause in its Cigarette Packaging and Labeling legislation. 95 The first presents a case of possibly appropriate re-

94. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALEJ. REG. 65, 100 (1989)
(supporting manufacturers desire for a regulatory compliance defense).
95. In fact, such legislastion has strong preemptive language. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334

(1988):
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
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forms violating presumptively state domains. Statutes of repose, more
rigorous requirements for prima facie cases, expanded defenses, and limits on damages may or may not be appropriate responses to current state
product liability regimes; however, these rules neither pass the contractenhancing test nor possess any other ethical or moral underpinning provoking national involvement. Therefore, advocates of such changes
should confine their quest to state legislatures.
Similarly, attempts by product liability defendants to avoid state
product liability recovery theories can have precarious moral foundations, as when defendants attempt to avoid liability by demonstrating
compliance with federal safety standards which include a saving clause.
In a recent example,96 Ford Motor Company claimed that federal motor
vehicle safety standards preempted New Hampshire common law to the
extent that such law might conclude that the absence of an air bag creates
a defectively designed car. The New Hampshire Supreme Court justified
its denial of federal preemption in this case because of the saving
clause. 97 Although Ford's theory furthered neither federalism nor contract, both the New Hampshire Supreme Court and Congress furthered
both, recognizing the importance of preserving historically, state-dominated domains. While most would agree that federal motor vehicle safety
standards represent appropriate Congressional activity, it would be a
grave violation of a presumptively state domain to attribute preemptive
force to these standards. They further neither contract nor federalism.
Those who wish to challenge state court decisions like this one must necessarily confine their arguments to the states.
As with cigarette labeling, Congress' failure to include a saving
clause has wrought inappropriate national incursions into presumptively
state domains. The preemptive force of the national labeling law has
eliminated potential state common law theories, including the duty to
wam, 98 in cigarette cases. Like the Pinto cases discussed earlier? many
of the cigarette cases revolve around the manufacturers having relevant
and important information that actual or potential smokers need to make

statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any
cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions
of this chapter.

!d.
96. Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345 (N.H. 1995).
97. !d. at 347.
98. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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rational choices. 100 Whether the common law should develop duties to
provide such information is an important question, one better left to the
states. In any case, it is difficult to fathom what, other than politics, motivated Congress not to protect the common law from the labeling law.
Such a decision furthered neither federalism nor contract.
C.

Competition Among States and Mobility Revisited

One might argue that by yielding to state law in all but contractenhancing cases, this contract-based model unfairly places the burden on
product producers and sellers because the resulting beneficiaries of information and power asymmetry reforms tend to be consumers. While
contract-enhancing norms might encourage national correction of these
asymmetries, changes in rules that do not further contract are, according
to the model, relegated to the states. The net effect is that product producers and sellers will be arguing their cases for reform before state, not national forums.
This is an appropriate outcome which is consistent with Dye's assertions about the benefits and costs of competition among states; that is, we
can fold state public policy decisions into our utility analyses and make
relocation decisions based upon these analyses. 101 In Part II, however, I
suggested that this type of analysis is more consistent with the location
decisions of businesses than those of individuals. 102 Seeking uniformity
through federally preemptive legislation certainly furthers the strategic
goals of producers and insurers but, according to Edmund Kitch, also
"portrays a short-term perspective of management" and trades "short-run
simplicity of uniform standards" for "the natural protection afforded by
competition." 103 Addressing product liability law, Kitch argues that states
should retain control over this regulatory area but that voters within a
state be apprised and pay the costs of that state's rigorous product liability rules. 104 A federal law that "permits manufacturers to sell their products in states at prices which can take into account their differential liability exposure" might preserve state product liability regimes. 105

100. What the tobacco companies knew but did not share with others appears to be grist for
many of our leading publications. Philip J. Hilts & Glenn Collins, Records Show Philip Morris
Studied Influence of Nicotine, N.Y. nMES, June 8, 1995, at AI; Jon Weiner, The Cigarette Papers.
THE NATION, Jan. I, 1996, at II; Dan Zegart, Buried Evidence: The Damaging Secret Documents
and Testimony Tobacco Companies Tried to Suppress, THE NATION, March 4, 1996, at II.
101. DYE, supra note 7, at 14.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
103. Kitch, supra note 9, at 124.
104. /d.
105. Kitch, supra note 9, at 125.
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Lawmakers would be incorrect to assume that the Kitch's assertion
regarding businesses describes individual behavior. Individuals may be
somewhat conscious of their public policy environments; however, they
likely know little about disparate state common law regimes. More importantly, a locus of control model applied to these regimes should not
include as an important component an assumption or requirement that
individuals are or should be aware of this esoteric body of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is undeniably difficult to separate the underlying reasons for product
liability or any reform from the issue oflocus of control. Too often, however, these reasons have subsumed federalism, rendering the institution a
political relic. Traditional norms, including those favoring presumptively
state domains, furnish little direction in these cases; rather they tend to
encourage both the politicization and subsumption of federalism. Contract provides a defensible and historical basis for deciding these locus of
control questions. Its underpinning, that federal preemption decisions be
based on contract-enhancing norms, provides a useful, additional analytic
tool to locus of control cases. A contract-enhancing norm allows Congress or the courts to preempt state domain only in those cases in which
such preemption can effectively level the information or power
assymetries arising under current state laws. In all other cases, states
should retain full regulatory control over such domains.

